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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENTS, INC.,
A California Corporation,

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

CASE NO. 19374

PAUL JEWKES & LORNA JEWKES,

Defendants-Appellants
APPELLANT'S PETITON FOR REHEARING

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a petition for rehearing in this case on the subject of attorney's fees
awarded by the trial court.

n
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
In this case this Court held that the attorney's fee awarded by the trial

court was based on an improper standard, i.e. ten percent of the amount of the
deed of trust in a foreclosure case.

However, because counsel had successfully

objected to testimony by counsel for Plaintiff as to the number of hours worked,
the Supreme Court allowed the exhorbitant fee to stand.

m
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent's attorney, in the case below attempted to prove the amount of
a reasonable attorney's fee in this foreclosure action by:
1.

Offering allegedly expert testimony of Ray Ivie that in a foreclosure

action a reasonable attorney's fee is always ten percent of the amount of the trust
deed note. The Note was for $265,770, making the fee $26,577. This testimony
was received over counsel's strenuous objections.
2.

Plaintiff's attorney attempted to take the stand himself as a witness

to testify as to the nature and extent of his work. Jewkes' attorney objected on
the ground that an attorney may not be a witness in a case in which he also acts as
counsel. The court sustained the objection. AID's attorney did not make an offer
of proof and did not attempt to prove the amount or value of his services from any
other source.
IV

ARGUMENT

The action of the Supreme Court in this case is a novel one. One cannot
help but be amused at the spectacle of an attorney who is hoist by hi.s own
petard.

To see an attorney whose objection is used to punish him for his too

clever (or too stupid) by half interference with the proof of his opponent's case
may make us smile.
However, the function of this court is not to punish a perhaps untimely or
ill considered objection, but rather to do justice.

Is it justice to require Mr. &

Mrs. Jewkes, already financially distressed defendants in a foreclosure case, to
pay a sum more than $20,000.00 in excess of a reasonable attorney's fee because
2

their counsel, by successfully objecting, had persuaded the trial court that
evidence tendered on the subject of attorney's fees was incompetent?
One can hardly argue that an objection sustained by the trial judge is
frivolous, and therefore this Court cannot be attempting to punish counsel for
making a frivolous objection. The Supreme Court, in attempting to punish counsel
for objecting to what it must deem to be competent evidence, has erred in at least
three particulars:
1.

It has made counsel and not the trial court the final judge of the

admissibility of evidence;
2.

It has made counsel responsible for allowing the opposition to prove

its case;
3.

It has ruled that when a party fails to prove its case in the trial court

with competent evidence, incompetent evidence may be used to reach a result
that is manifestly unjust.
Counsel has been unable to find any case or commentary which sustains the
result reached by the Supreme Court in this case.
Zimmerman has cited

In his opinion, Justice

Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P2d 162 (Utah 1981) and

Hickman v. Houghton Elevator Co., 268 Or. 192, 195, 519 P2d 369, 373 (1974).
Even a superficial analysis of these cases in di ca tes that they do not support the
proposition for which they are cited.
In Kohler the attorney who had tendered the evidence in question was

contending on appeal that certain evidence should have been accepted as an
exc•eµtion to the hearsay rule. However, the evidence had been excluded at trial
for lack of foundation and the attorney tendering the evidence did not urge its
admissability at trial on the grounds urged on appeal.

The trial court observed

that if evidence is excluded on one ground and the evidence may be admissable
3
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another ground, the attorney offering the evidence must specify the correct
ground at trial, citing McCormick on Evidence, p. 112 (1972) as follows:
If counsel specifies a purpose for which the proposed evidence
is inadmisable and the judge excludes, counsel cannot complain of
the ruling on appeal though it could have been rightly admitted for
another purpose.

Thus, the exclusion of the evidence was sustained.
In addition, in Kohler the court held that the trial court had correctly

decided the case on the basis of the evidence introduced which was sufficient to
enable the court to reach its verdict.
The instant case differs from the Kohler case in at least two respects:
1.

The appellate court in Kohler held that the trial court had reached a

correct result. In this case the Utah Supreme Court has held that the trial court
used an impermissible standard and thus reached an incorrect result. The court
says, at page 3 of the slip opinions, ''In the instant case, the trial court failed to
apply the appropriate standard in assessing attorney's fees."
2.

The excluded evidence was tendered by the party seeking to reverse

the holding, rather than the successful attorney at trial.

In this case, the trial

court refused to admit evidence which might have assisted it in arriving at a
correct decision. There is, however, no indication that the trial court's attorney
fee award would in any way have been different had AID's attorney been allowed
to testify. Thus counsel did not prevent a correct verdict by his objection. The
state of the record on the subject of attorney's fees in the trial court was that
improper evidence had been received stating that a reasonable attorney's fee in a
$265,000.00 foreclosure action was 10%. No other evidence was admitted. Thu>.
on the state of the record, the trial court should have ruled that no competent
evidence existed on the record and then taken one of two actions: (a) award no
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ttorney's fees on the ground that no competent evidence as to the amount of a

reeionable attorney's fee had been introduced, or; (b) used its own evaluation of
the services rendered in the case and awarded fees based on that evaluation. It
did neither.
As in the Kohler case, counsel for Plaintiff in this case failed to take the

proper actions which would have enabled him to introduce competent evidence of
the number of hours worked. He did not, as the Utah Rules of Evidence require
make an offer of proof (see old Rule 5, then in effect)
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or
decision based thereon be reversed by reason of the erroneous
exclusion of evidence unless (a) it appears of record that the
proponent of the evidence either made known the substance of the
vidence in a form and by a method approved by the judge, or
indicated the substance of the expected evidence by questions
indicating the desired answers •...

Counsel for AID did not make an offer of proof. Neither did he try to prove the
hours he worked (as he easily could have done) by calling an employee from his
office and offering his time records under the business records exception.
What this court has held is that plaintiff's counsel, though he failed to
introduce competent evidence, is entitled to an exorbitant and unjust fee based on
improper evidence and an error of the trial court in relying on such evidence.
In addition to Kohler, the court cited Hickman, supra, in support of its

decision to let the trial court's error stand. Hickman, again does not support the
court's action in this case. In Hickman the trial court had rejected a special jury
verdict on the ground that it had been reached contrary to the trial court's
I<istructions. Counsel for defendant contended on appeal that the verdict should
hAve been accepted by the trial court.

However, the defendant's attorney had

failed to ask the trial court to accept the verdict, asking instead for a mistrial.
The Oregon Supreme Court refused to grant relief to defendant on the ground that
he had failed to ask for such relief in the trial court.
5

Once again we do not have a case like the present one. In this case the
court has held that counsel objects at this peril to evidence offered by the other
side and he is not insulated by the fact that the court has determined his objection
to be valid.

He is charged with the responsibility of foreseeing all possible

consequences of his action.

If he makes an error in making an instantaneous

decision which can obligate him to bear his opponent's burden of proof, he may
wind up with an erroneous verdict which is sustained on appeal because his
objection prevented the introduction of evidence which, though the trial court
may ignore it, the appellate court may use as a grounds for reversal.
Rule 104 of the current Utah Rules of Evidence states, in pertinent part:
"Preliminary questions concerning the ... admissability of evidence shall be
determined by the court." Thus, counsel is not responsible for an erroneous ruling
by the court concerning admissibility.

Making counsel responsible for errors in

admission of evidence would be too heavy a burden. Counsel must bear the weight
of proving his own case, but cannot be charged with responsibility for allowing or
assisting his opponent to prove his.

The side which fails to prove its case must

bear the cost of such failure, whether or not it has been triggered by an objection
from opposing counsel.
When, as in this case, the failure of proof is compounded by failing to make
an offer of proof and failure to use a convenient alternative method of proof,
Plaintiff must bear and loss resulting from inability to persuade the court of the
admissability of tendered service.

CONCLUSION
It would be unjust to allow a trial court error to stand simply be ca use the
trial court could have reached a correct result if it had admitted and based its
6
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upon evidence excluded in response to objection.

-, 111 ,5

not an acceptable means of punishing counsel for an objection the court

ocn1s

Sustaining an unjust

improper.
Respectfully submitted,

H. Hal Visick
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER
92 North Diversity Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

"'"

Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
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